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Bastardy Litigation in 
Medieval England 
by R. H. HELMHOLZ* 
Of the areas of conflict between Church and State in medieval 
England, not many present the apparent clarity of opposition that 
bastardy litigation does. Maitland described it as a "collision 
between the claims" of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. The 
most famous instance of this collision, to which Maitland was in 
fact referring, is a familiar one. It is the story of the Council of 
Merton.- The bishops, anxious to bring English law into accord with 
what they conceived to be the clear dictates of religion, reason and 
civil law, urged upon the baronage the proposition that children 
born before the marriage of their parents should be counted as 
legitimate at English law. The barons refused. And their unanimous 
shout, "Nolumus mutare leges Angliae," has since been celebrated 
for more reasons than one. 
The history of the dispute does not, however, end there. The 
legal issues involved are more varied, more complex, and more 
ambiguous than the incident at Merton alone suggests. And the 
response of the English courts to the problems created by the areas 
of disagreement was far from static. The more one examines the 
history of bastardy litigation, the clearer it becomes that the story 
cannot adequately be described strictly in the terms of a collision 
at Merton. Rather, one finds substantial areas of compromise and 
even of agreement, on the part of both sides. The purpose of this 
article is to explore the development of the handling of the dis- 
puted questions, both from the point of view of the canonists and 
from that of the English Common Law courts. Working through 
that development provides an instructive chapter in the history 
of legal relations between Church and State in the Middle Ages. It 
* Department of History, University of California, Berkeley. 
1. For a reconstruction of the chronology of the events surrounding 
this incident, see F. W. Maitland's introduction to Bracton's Notebook 
(London, 1887), 14-17. Maitland's more extended treatment of the con- 
flict is in Roman Canon Law in the Church of England (London, 1898), 
52 et seq. Felix Makower's Constitutional History of the Church of Eng- 
land, (London, 1895), 422-23 is also useful. The best, straightforward pre- 
sentation of the English law on the subject is W. Hooper, The Law of 
Illegitimacy (Londcki, 1911). See also J. D. White, "Legitimation by Sub- 
sequent Marriage", 36 L. Q. Rev., 255-67 (1920). 
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also sheds light on an important aspect of the growth and maturing 
of the English Common Law in the fourteenth century. 
It is well to start with the precise problem firmly in mind. No 
dispute between regnum and sacerdotium in the Middle Ages 
existed in a vacuum, dependent on rhetoric or theory alone, and 
this dispute was, if anything, more concrete than most. It turned 
around a precise legal issue, namely inheritance of real property. 
Whatever ideological problems bastardy litigation might ultimately 
raise, jurisdiction over land was always at its center. Now, land 
held in lay fee was within the cognizance of the secular courts. All 
sides agreed on that. It was equally agreed, however, that deter- 
mination of a man's legitimacy belonged to the spiritual courts. 
As long as marriage, divorce and adultery were thought of as dis- 
tinctly spiritual, this was perhaps natural. In concrete terms, the 
distinction meant that whenever an issue of bastardy was raised 
in the royal courts, the process there was suspended and a writ sent 
to the bishop, asking for a resolution of the bastardy issue. Not 
that the bishops had any very expert way of determining the ques- 
tion. Before the very end of the Middle Ages, there were no parish 
registers or other records to help them. In fact, the issue was usually 
determined by a sworn inquisition of neighbours, no more 
reliable and not at bottom much different from a Common law jury. 
The common fame of the country was the source of the verdict in 
both forums.2 There was no intrinsic reason for having the Church 
decide the issue. But it seemed more fitting. After the ecclesiastical 
inquisition, the bishop or his officials certified the answer to the 
secular court, which could then finish the case accordingly.3 In 
2. The following extract from a case heard in the diocese of Canter- 
bury and on this problem will perhaps make the point. Dean and Chap- 
ter Archives, Ecclesiastical Suit 310: "..... facta fuit inquisitio si ulti- 
mus partus dicte Johanne post formam factam procreatus esset partus 
dicti Ricardi. Dicebat inquisitio iurata quod fuerat partus dicti Ricardi 
et non alterius, quia de alio non fuerat defamata et talis est communis 
fama patrie." When witnesses were asked in the church courts about 
the source of their knowledge on legitimacy, their answers usually 
came down to this: "communis fama laborat quod dicta C. fuerat nata 
in legitimo matrimonio," or that the knowledge came "de relatu sen- 
iorum suorum qui habuerunt plenam noticiam;" Canterbury Consistory 
Court Deposition Book, X. 10.1, f. 47v (1420). An interesting side light 
on the ecclesiastical attitude comes from an attempt in 1294 to oust a 
clerk from his benefice for illegitimacy. He argued that he could not be 
illegitimate because his elder brother had succeeded as legitimate heir 
"secundum legem Anglie;" Sede Vacante Scrapbook III, no. 396. 
3. A number of the king's writs with the episcopal returns from the 
14th and 15th centuries are preserved in the Public Record Office, Lon- 
don, C.47/15/4 and E.135/7. 
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most cases, determination of the bastardy question would neces- 
sarily decide the outcome of the principal case. 
The problems arose, as in the situation of the Statute of Mer- 
ton, when Church and State did not apply the same substantive law. 
Whom one considers a bastard depends, after all, entirely on one's 
definition of legitimacy. When the two laws accepted definitions at 
variance with each other the question came down to this: would 
the secular courts be bound to follow the canonical definition of 
legitimacy because of the acknowledged principle that the subject 
lay within the Church's jurisdiction? Or would the ecclesiastical 
courts agree that the secular law should prevail because land was 
the subject of the action? It is worth pointing out that this was not 
a problem confined to England. Although Continental jurisdictions, 
following more closely the Roman Law texts, were closer to agree- 
ment with the canonical definition of bastardy, the definitions were 
not always identical.4 The conflict was not a strictly insular one. 
I 
For canonists, the question of how bastardy should be settled 
could not be without some degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, 
a decretal of Alexander III (X 4.17.1) stated clearly that a pre- 
nuptial child was legitimate and could not be disinherited for that 
reason. On the other hand, no matter how one dissected the matter, 
it came in the end down to a question of real property. A man sued 
not to have his legitimacy publicly proclaimed, but to recover land 
he thought belonged to him. And here canonists had to deal with 
another decretal of Alexander III (X 4.17.7) which seemed to say 
that feudal law controlled. This decretal grew out of an English case 
in which papal judges delegate had adjudged possession of land to 
a man whose mother (through whom he claimed the land) was 
challenged as illegitimate. Henry II objected strenuously to this 
invasion of his rights. He was, in the decretal's words "motus et 
turbatus." Because of that objection, Alexander III ordered the 
case returned to the royal courts. The matter of legitimacy alone 
remained to the Church, "although," the decretal says, the double 
procedure "may seem incongruous." The decretal does not authorise 
the royal court to go ahead without the canonical determination 
of bastardy, but it was to acknowledge that on the fundamental 
4. For example, at Roman Law the consent of the parents was re- 
quired to legitimate the child (D. 1.6.11). On this subject see Constant 
Van de Wiel, La Ldgitimation par mariage subsequent chez les roma- 
nistes et les decretalistes jusqu'en 1650 (Antwerp, 1962). The author 
doubts, however, whether in practice the Roman law categories were al- 
ways observed. 
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issue of what court should try ownership of the land, the secular 
court has jurisdiction. This the canonists themselves clearly per- 
ceived, as they showed by their efforts to distinguish it. One said 
that this second decretal applied only to cases of spoliation, not to 
claims for inheritance.5 Another said that because the events which 
gave rise to the decretal occurred before John had granted and re- 
ceived back his kingdom as a papal fief, it was no longer good law 
for England.6 But these convinced no one, not even their authors. 
The canon law position had really to rest on the argument that 
the secular courts were bound to follow the canon law's determina- 
tion of legitimacy for inheritance purposes, because of the in- 
herent superiority of Church to State. This was the only clear way 
out of a logical impasse. Hostiensis took the occasion of comment- 
ing on the question to launch into the standard medieval compari- 
son of the sacerdotium to the sun, the regnum to the moon, the 
obvious point being that the State, like the moon, was totally de- 
pendent for its light on the priestly sun.7 In truth, the situation 
raised exactly that problem. If the king were really the moon, he 
had no choice but to let the light of canon law settle the determina- 
tive question of bastardy. If the pope were the sun, there could be 
no question that secular law was derivative, subject to correction 
by the pope's law. Accept the premise, and the logical problem is 
solved. The Church courts should determine legitimacy for inherit- 
ance purposes. Hostiensis put it with clarity: "in no way does it be- 
long to the secular court to judge, but rather execution and admit- 
tance of the legitimate person belongs to it." 8 
In general, this was the position taken by canonists. There 
was, nonetheless, some appreciation for the arguments on the 
other side. Antonius de Butrio noted in his analysis of this problem 
5. gl. ord. ad X 4.17.1 s.v. hac occasione: "Non est contra; ibi princi- 
paliter committitur causa super questione spoliationis, quae ad papam 
non pertinet inter eos qui non sunt suae iurisdictionis." 
6. Joannes Andreae, Novella Commentaria in Libros Decretalium ad 
X 4.17.7 (Venice, 1581), ". ..., sed hodie secus esset, cum postea 
Johannes rex Anglie filius Henrici maioris, quando Johannes successit 
in regno Ricardo fratri suo, recepit ab ecclesia Romana in feudum totum 
regnum." 
7. Summa Aurea, t. quifilii sunt legitimi, c. 9 (Venice, 1574), col. 1385. 
And see Panormitanus, Commentaria in quartum et quintum decretalium 
ad X 4.17.5 (Lyons, 1555), f. 39v; Note also X 2.10.3. 
8. Summa Aurea, col. 1386: ".... nullo modo ad secularem pertinet 
iudicare, sed bene pertinet ad eum executio et admittere legitimum, eo 
quod de legitimatione fuerit coram ecclesia facta fides." This theme is 
treated in the recent work by J. Watt, "The Theory of Papal Monarchy in 
the Thirteenth Century", Traditio, Vol. 20, 281 et seq. (1964) and also re- 
printed in book form (London 1965), 107 et seq. 
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that the Church should not disturb the jurisdiction of laymen, and 
that "it seems to detract from it to judge a case belonging to its 
judgement according to another law." 9 Joannes Andreae noted, 
though he did not unequivocally endorse, a more technical position 
favourable to secular jurisdiction. When, he wrote, bastardy 
was raised only "in the manner of an exception," the secular court 
could reasonably retain the case instead of sending it to the 
Church.10 And Panormitanus, in the fifteenth century, held that 
a man legitimate for canon law purposes would not ipso facto be a 
legitimate heir, since the "custom of the country" might stand in 
the way.11 Still, even for these writers, logic dictated that bastardy 
was a matter for determination by the tribunals of the Church. 
The strongest sentiment mitigating the logic of the hierocratic 
point of view was the knowledge that, in the fact, it was not widely 
accepted. Joannes Andreae, after the passage just mentioned, went 
on to say that in principle the king's claims to jurisdiction over bas- 
tardy in inheritance cases might not be justified, but added that it 
was well to accept them, since "we do not wish to scandalize 
him." 12 And the marginal gloss to the standard glossa ordinaria 
noted, "But today in this kingdom the secular judge takes cogniz- 
ance no matter what, and there is no remission to the Church." '3 
As an appendage to his strong stand, Hostiensis wrote: "this, how- 
ever, the legists hardly concede to us, but by strictness and natural 
reason I do not doubt that it is to be held." 14 
9. Lectura super quarto decretalium ad X 4.17.7 (Rome, 1474), f. 86v: 
"Nota quarto quod ad iudiciu;n ecclesie non pertinet iudicare de tem- 
poralibus inter puros laicos et quod ecclesia non debet turbare iurisdic- 
tionem laicorum, quod detrahere videtur iuri alterius eo quod iudicat 
de causa ad eius non spectante iudicium." 
10. Novella Commentaria ad X 4.17.5: "Verum tamen cum in modo ex- 
ceptionis fuerit hoc oppositum coram iudice seculari, videtur quod sicut 
ipse cognosceret de exceptione que in suam jurisdictionem caderet sine 
libelli exceptione, sicut iudex ecclesiasticus qui in locum illius succedit 
sine libello procedere poterit." A useful discussion is contained in Inno- 
cent IV, Apparatus super decretalibus ad X 4.17.7 (Lyons, 1525), f. 183, 
noting disagreement among the canonists themselves. 
11. Lectura ad X 2.10.3: "non sequitur est legitimus, ergo heres, quia 
posset obstare consuetudo patrie; ideo semper est hec questio remit- 
tenda ad secularem." 
12. ibid. ad X 4.17.7: ". ... asserit pertinere sibi; non tamen est ita in 
hoc casu, sed nolumus ipsum scandalizare." 
13. See gl. ord. ad X 4.17.4: "Sed hodie in hoc regno indistincte iudex 
secularis cognoscit, nec fit remissio ad ecclesiam." 
14. Summa Aurea, col. 1386: "Hoc tamen legistae vix concederent 
nobis, sed de rigore et ratione naturali non dubito sic tenendum." And 
see Raymond de Peilafort, Summa de Poenitentia et Matrimonio (Avignon, 
1715), 431-32. 
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What had happened is that, on the Continent, the practice of 
sending questions of bastardy to the Church courts gradually dis- 
appeared.15 Beaumanoir, writing in the 1280's, gave it as the rule 
that in inheritance disputes secular courts in his area might make 
their own determination of legitimacy.16 The practice was not uni- 
form in his day, but it was all but universal by the fourteenth cen- 
tury. The Church's theoretical rights were simply ignored. Canon- 
ists had little choice but to acquiesce in this decision and content 
themselves with the reminder that, by strict logic, the result ought 
perhaps to have been otherwise. Surely there were strong practical 
reasons for acquiescence. Reference to the ecclesiastical courts 
was time-consuming, necessarily irksome to the parties, and usually 
unnecessary. And when the subject of the ultimate dispute was, by 
the canon law's own principles, within the jurisdiction of secular 
law, the whole matter was not one in which the strictest sort of 
logic alone could control. This the canonists came close to admitt- 
ing. They recognised the arguments on both sides and raised little 
objection to the fact that the "clerical" argument was not being fol- 
lowed. 
In England, the Church certainly took this temperate position. 
Trial of bastardy in inheritance cases by the Church courts found 
few churchmen willing to lend it strong support. The very judges 
who insisted on the rights of the secular courts to determine the 
issue according to English law were, in the middle years of the 
thirteenth century, themselves clerics. It is interesting to note that 
Grosseteste, the leading figure among the bishops at the time of the 
Council of Merton, argued not that Church courts must decide the 
question, but that English law should be changed to accord with the 
only position, as he thought, in harmony with reason and divine 
law. Few men accepted more fully the hierocratic doctrines of sub- 
ordination of secular to spiritual power than did Robert Grosseteste. 
In a letter he wrote to William Raleigh, then a royal judge, urging 
the legitimacy of children born before their parents' marriage, 
15. For a more thorough modern treatment, see R. G6nestal, Histoire 
de la legitimation des enfants naturels en droit canonique (Paris, 1905), 
100 et seq.; A. Friedberg, De finium inter ecclesiam et civitatem regun- 
dorum judicio (Leipzig, 1861), 121; A. Esmein, Le mariage en droit 
canonique (Paris, 1891), Vol. 1, 31. The issue was not entirely an historical 
one for Charles Fevret, Traite de I'abus (Lyons, 1736), Vol. 1, 539 et seq. 
He discusses, and dismisses, the "distinctions subtiles des Ultramon- 
tains" on which, he claims, the ecclesiastical case depended. 
16. Philippe de Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaises, ed. A. Salmon 
(Paris, 1899), no. 578, "Et pour ce que teus debas depent de l'eritage, con- 
vient il a la fois que juges seculiers s'entremete de connoistre la bas- 
tardie qui es proposee par devant li." 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:59:19 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
366 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XIII 
Grosseteste rehearsed these very arguments at length.17 But even 
he did not say that only the Church could try the issue of bastardy. 
This is to admit, at least by implication, that the English courts 
might exercise that jurisdiction. If only they would do so in accord 
with the correct definition of bastardy. 
What the bishops at Merton, following Grosseteste's lead, were 
unwilling to do, no matter whether they conceded that the royal 
courts could try bastrady, was to use their own courts to enforce the 
substantive position of English law. To sanction the use of their 
own courts to deny inheritance to a man who was canonically legiti- 
mate was quite a different matter from accepting, without great 
protest, that the English courts might do so. Practice prior to the 
Statute of Merton had required them to co-operate, in unmistakable 
fashion, in reaching that result. The writ from the royal justices 
asked them to specify whether the person had been born before or 
after wedlock.1s To answer this made them co-workers in English 
legal practice, whereas if asked merely to determine bastardy 
in general terms, the bishop's court could follow its own law. 
Where an answer to a specific question on the cause of alleged 
bastardy was demanded, and we shall see that it was demanded in 
other cases besides that of pre-nuptial children, the bishops baulked. 
But the long lists of clerical grievances surviving from the next two 
centuries after the Statute of Merton mention nothing of demands 
that jurisdiction should be returned to the Church in bastardy 
cases. I have found but one exception, and it is only apparent. Dur- 
ing the reign of Edward II, attempts were made by some lawyers, 
through the use of changes in the wording of the pleadings, to de- 
prive the Church courts of jurisdiction over even those bastardy 
cases where no substantive conflict between the two laws existed.19 
17. Roberti Grosseteste Epistolae, ed. J. R. Luard (R. S., Vol. 35), 77 et 
seq. Grosseteste wrote that the ancient practice of England on children 
born before their parents' marriage had been in accord with the canon 
law. There does not appear to be any very positive evidence one way or 
the other on this point, but it is worth noting that G6ndstal concluded 
in his history of the subject (at 136) that legitimation by subsequent 
marriage was no part of Church law prior to the 12th century. The ec- 
clesiastical writing he studied seemed, in fact, to assume that no legiti- 
mation would take place. 
18. In Glanvill's day the bishop was asked to judge if the party "bas- 
tardus fuit natus ante matrimonium." Tractatus de legibus, ed. G. D. G. 
Hall (London, 1967), 87. Bracton argued that the bishops were still ob- 
liged to answer the specific question, and gave an expanded version of 
suitable writs, but it seems clear that by his time they were no longer 
co-operating with the English position. See De legibus et consuetudi- 
nibus Angliae, ed. G. E. Woodbine (New Haven, 1915-42), f. 419b. 
19. See below. 
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The words used to make the claim of bastardy, it was argued, 
should control how the question should be tried. Here the bishops 
could answer the writ without difficulty; technicality alone robbed 
them of jurisdiction. But otherwise, Grosseteste had no successors. 
Even more than the canonists, the English Church was content to 
observe that practice did not conform to the ideal standard, to 
avoid direct involvement in reaching the result sanctioned by the 
English law, and to live, not unhappily, with the result.2" 
II 
The bishops' refusal to answer writs on bastardy in accord with 
English inheritance law necessarily forced the Common Law jus- 
tices to draw a line between those cases they would send to the 
Church and those they would not. Where the two laws had different 
views of bastardy, the question would have to be kept out of the 
bishops' hands. In the eyes of Bracton and those of following cen- 
turies, the date of the Statute of Merton was commonly regarded 
as the landmark date, one which forced on English lawyers a 
realization of the divergence of the laws of Church and State. In 
the Year Book case of 1338, for example, Scrope, J. remarked that 
"before the Statute if it was alleged that a man was born outside 
espousals, the practice was to send to the bishop to certify ...; ever 
since the custom is not to inquire anything in those cases, except 
where bastardy is purely alleged." 21 Modem writers have gen- 
erally adopted that description. Prior to Merton, the Church heard 
bastardy cases; afterwards only those where the law of bastardy 
was identical under both laws. Cases where there was a conflict 
were tried by assize as any other issue might be. 
Investigation of the pre-1234 cases shows, however, that prac- 
tice was not so uniformly in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction as 
Scrope's opinion indicates. Many cases of alleged bastardy went to 
the bishops which would afterwards have been tried by assize, that 
certainly is clear. But on the other hand, there are many which 
were being tried by assize even before that date. It seems impossible 
to explain the divergence of practice along any very consistent prin- 
20. How unanimous in following Grosseteste's position the bishops 
were, or how consistent when it came to their own interest, is illus- 
trated by a case in Bracton's Notebook (no. 1181) from 1237. The bishop 
of Carlisle sued Adam Wigenhale, arguing that Adam had no right to 
land in dispute, since his title descended through a man born before his 
parents had married. This was, of course, to stand with the barons. On 
the English clergy's attitude towards the whole problem see F. M. Po- 
wicke, The Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), 70-71. 
21. 11 Lib. Ass. no. 20, f. 32 (1337). 
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ciples. A possessory action in 1226 was determined by assize, re- 
sulting in a decision that the claimant was born before the espousal 
of his parents, and hence incapable of inheriting. Three years later, 
a similar case was sent to the bishop of Norwich.22 In other cases 
we meet this same lack of consistency.23 Probably the question of 
where to send the bastardy issue was settled case by case, consider- 
ing the wishes of the parties. This almost certainly was the practice 
later on, for we find on the plea rolls cases in which the parties 
agree to trial by other than the usual method.24 
It is one of Bracton's most impressive achievements to have 
taken the confused mass of English legal material and to have 
extracted from it generally consistent principles of law. When we 
consider the lack of legal handbooks and the miscellaneous re- 
cruitment of the English judges in the first half of the thirteenth 
century, it is no surprise that practice did not always conform 
exactly to what Bracton or other commentators wrote. Anything 
else would have been virtually impossible. But on this specific point 
of the decisiveness of the decisions of the Council of Merton, it is an 
exaggeration to say that the decision to try bastardy by assize was 
an innovation. The Common Law justices had submitted questions 
of bastardy to jurors before; thereafter they had merely to continue, 
and to extend, that practice. But they did have to be more careful. 
It had been pointed out in clear fashion that the bishops would re- 
fuse to co-operate in reaching a result they were bound to regard 
as iniquitous. 
By retaining questions of bastardy for trial by assize, the royal 
justices took a course which in fact restricted the jurisdiction of the 
Church. And because that restriction went, as we shall see, beyond 
the case of pre-nuptial children, it is often cited as an area of strug- 
gle for jurisdiction between Church and State. Or at least an area of 
encroachment by the royal courts on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The 
matter was, of course, entirely in the hands of the common law- 
22. Compare Bracton's Notebook, no. 1879, with Curia Regis Rolls, 
XIII, no. 2133. 
23. For pre-1234 cases in which bastardy was tried by assize, see Brac- 
ton's Notebook, nos. 227, 257, 1879; Curia Regis Rolls, IV, 16; VIII, 43; 
XII, no. 2075; XIII, nos. 211, 1339. 
24. For example, P.R.O. K.B. 27/373 (Mich. 27 Edw. III) m. 46: "Et pre- 
dicti Willelmus et Joannes Petche dicunt quod . ... predicta Joanna 
bastarda est, ita quod nullius heres potest, et hoc petunt quod inquira- 
tur per assisam. Et predictus Henricus dicit quod predicta Joanna legi- 
tima est et non bastarda, et paratus est verificare per assisam. Et pre- 
dicti Willelmus et Johannes Petche similiter; ideo capiatur inter eos as- 
sisa." See also C.P. 40/121 (Mich. 25-26 Edw. I) m. 129d; K.B. 27/198 (Mich. 
3 Edw. II) m. 126; C.P. 40/395 (Trin. 32 Edw. III) m. 458. 
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yers. After Grosseteste's protest, the Church did not raise objections 
on the matter, perhaps considering the ambiguity of its own law, 
and the royal courts were left to fix the line between spiritual and 
secular. Watching them fix that line shows something of their atti- 
tude towards Church-State relations. It is equally revealing in 
showing the growth of the English Common Law in the fourteenth 
century. We shall see that only in the middle of that century did 
the question of bastardy litigation reach a state of clear and con- 
sistent definition. That definition was not, we shall also see, 
achieved at the expense of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. As a way of 
tracing the development, let me take the specific instances of con- 
flict beyond that of pre-nuptial children, one at a time. This requires 
delaying examination of the difficulties and changes in the four- 
teenth century, but it is necessary to appreciate the legal back- 
ground from which they arose. Some have been well set out by Mait- 
land and others, and require only statement. Some require more. 
First, English law and canon law took quite different posi- 
tions on the legitimacy of children born within wedlock but of 
adulterous liaisons. The reluctance of English law to bastardize 
any child born to a married woman goes back at least to the 12th 
Century.25 But it was not until after the events surrounding Merton 
that the royal courts made consistent efforts to keep these cases 
out of the bishops' courts. A case from 1229 well illustrates the 
practice before that date. It arose in a writ of right for some 
land in Gloucestershire. To the claim the tenant answered, ad- 
mitting the marriage on which the demandant's title depended, 
but saying that on the wedding night the bridegroom had found 
his new wife "gross and pregnant" and had expelled her from his 
bed.26 He had had no access to her prior to the demandant's 
birth. Thus there could be, he argued, no question of inheritance 
of the land. The issue of bastardy, thus raised, was sent to the 
Church courts. Now this is just the sort of case the English courts 
had an interest in keeping out of the canon law system. Assuming 
the truth of the allegations of bastardy, the demandant would have 
25. Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis, eds. D. L. Douie and H. Farmer (Lon- 
don, 1962) Vol. II, 20 et seq. A somewhat similar case is found in the 
Chancery Miscellaneous Records from 1390 (P.R.O. C. 47/15/4 no. 9). The 
wife of Ralph Basset had smuggled in the child of another woman and 
treated that child as her own. The true mother, some thirteen years lat- 
er, the record asserts, admitted the fraud to a cleric, who urged that 
she seek "restitution" of the child. The whole matter came before the 
Chancery when the inheritance of Ralph was in dispute, but unfortu- 
nately, I have been unable to find any sign of the final result of the 
case. 
26. Bracton's Notebook, no. 1229. 
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lost his case by canon law, and won it by English law.27 Whether 
in 1229 the bishops were answering the writ in specific terms, al- 
lowing the courts to apply the English rule of refusing to bastardize 
adulterine children, as they did with pre-nuptial children, or whe- 
ther the royal justices were simply not alert to the difference, does 
not appear from the record. We do not know. But cases after 1234 
show that the difference was being taken into account.28 Where 
bastardy because of adultery was alleged, the matter would not be 
sent to the bishop. 
The reasoning used to justify the English law's unwillingness 
to bastardize children born of adultery is curious. Common 
lawyers were led to make some extravagant arguments in favor of 
a position which so clearly violated common sense. For instance, 
it was said that if a husband was in France at any time when con- 
ception could have taken place, the child was legitimate, no matter 
how clear the adultery. The reason: the husband might have slipped 
across the Channel at night. Only if he were as far off as the Holy 
Land was the result otherwise.29 Finally, the even more mechani- 
cal test of the four seas, that is the limits of the kingdom, was 
settled on as the dividing line. And when called upon to produce an 
argument for legitimacy, the pleaders of the fifteenth century re- 
treated to the homely analogy, "Whoso bulleth my cow, the calf 
is mine."30 The "four seas" test was given up only in 1732, and 
then only (as Nicolas said) "on account of its absolute nonsense."'31 
But even today, although perhaps for other reasons, the presump- 
tion that a child born in wedlock is legitimate is "one of the strong- 
est and most persuasive known to the law."32 
27. See Littleton's statement in Y.B. 18 Edw. IV, Hil. no. 28, f. 29 
(1478), ". ... si home espouse un feme grosment enseint ove un auter 
et deins iii jours apres ele est deliver, en nostre ley l'issue est mulier, et 
par le ley de seint Esglise bastard." 
28. Y.BB. 2 Edw. II (Selden Soc. Vol. 19) 55 (1308-09); 39 Edw. III, 
Mich., f. 31 (1365); 44 Edw. III, Pasch. no. 21, f. 12 (1370). But see Y.B. 39 
Edw. III, Pasch., f. 14 (1365), a case in which one party was obliged to pe- 
tition Parliament for a remedy after the question of bastardy had been 
sent to the Church. For English law on this subject, see Harris Nicolas, 
A Treatise on the Law of Adulterine Bastardy (London, 1836). 
29. Bracton, f. 418; Y.B. Hil. 32-33 Edw. I (Rolls Series), 63. A case 
from Hil. 35 Edw. I, in which it was held that even where the husband 
had been in the Holy Land, the child was held legitimate, is reported in 
the unprinted "Pleas at Law 1300-12", Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 35,116, f. 65v. 
30. Y.BB. 43 Edw. III, Trin. no. 5, f. 19 (1369); 9 Hen. IV, Hil. no. 13, f. 
9 (1407). 
31. Treatise, 164. The rule was abrogated in Pendrell v. Pendrell 2 Stra. 
925. See also Co. Lit. 244a. 
32. 10 Corpus Juris Secundum 21 sec. 3. 
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Second, English law differed from canon law on the legitimacy 
of the children of divorced parents. The Church evolved a number 
of standards for judging the matter, the most important of which 
involved investigation of the formal correctness of the marriage and 
the good faith of the parents.33 If they were innocent of wrong- 
doing and knowledge of the impediment which rendered their 
union unlawful, or at least if one of them was, their children were 
legitimate. Otherwise, the children were not. English law required 
a simpler rule, one easier to state, less difficult to prove, and not 
so open to fraud. By the reign of Edward III, this had been adopted: 
divorce for affinity or consanguinity did not bastardize the child, 
while divorce for pre-contract did.34 
It seems obvious that the same rationale of visiting the 
parents' fault on their children lay behind both the English and the 
canonical rule. One may more easily believe that a person has 
ignored the extent of his kinship than that he has forgotten con- 
tracting marriage or professing monastic vows. Thus it seemed right 
to impose the penalty of bastardy more readily in the latter case. 
It may also be fair to think that the early English rule shows signs 
of a sensible dislike of the wide sweeping net of kinship disqualifica- 
tions that complicate, and in a measure discredit, the medieval law 
of marriage. But, in any event, English substantive law took a dif- 
ferent position from that of the canon law, and royal justices would, 
at least if one party demanded it, force the other to state the specific 
cause of divorce. If the cause was pre-contract, the ordinary writ 
would be sent to the bishop, since the substantive result would be 
the same under both laws. If it was consanguinity, that ended the 
matter. The court would not issue the writ, but would instead force 
the party to proceed to another issue or be non-suited. It is well to 
note, however, that this was true only when the case involved 
inheritance of real property. Where the issue was the marriage 
itself, the question of divorce went to the bishop, no matter what 
the cause for divorce was. If, for example, the question of the 
validity of a marriage were raised in a suit for dower, it was referred 
to the bishops. This without regard for the grounds of challenge, 
or the form in which it was made.35 The point was to safeguard 
33. X 4.17.2. 
34. Bracton, f. 299, Y.B. Pasch. 11-12 Edw. III (R.S.), 480-87. The law 
was later changed to the even simpler rule of bastardizing even children 
born to parents divorced for affinity or consanguinity, although it is 
fair to say that the law continued to be uncertain on the subject. See 
Y.B. 18 Edw. IV, Hil. no. 28, f. 19 (1479), Hooper, Law of Illegitimacy, 51. 
35. Y.BB. Hil. 32-33 Edw. I (R.S.), 4-7; Trin. 14 Edw. III (R.S.), 322-325; 
C.P. 40/115 (Mich. 24-25 Edw. I) mm. 40, 86; C.P. 40/129 (Trin. 27 Edw. I) m. 
137d. 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:59:19 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
372 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XIII 
principles of English inheritance law, not to seize upon every ex- 
cuse to exclude episcopal jurisdiction. 
Common lawyers sometimes had harsh things to say about 
the handling of divorce litigation in the Church courts. A case from 
1365 illustrates one reason. The bishop of Ely's commissary had, 
during his visitation, uncovered information showing that John T's 
father had been godfather to his wife's cousin. According to canon 
law rules, this relationship made marriage without grace of dis- 
pensation impossible, and the commissary, zealous for the rigor of 
the law, or wishing to harass the unfortunate John, proceeded 
to celebrate a divorce between John's parents. That those parents 
were themselves dead at the time was not a necessary canonical 
impediment to the divorce.36 Subsequently, and perhaps inevit- 
ably, John was involved in litigation over his inheritance, and bas- 
tardy was objected against him. Whether or not he would have been 
held legitimate in the spiritual courts depends on factors not given 
in either the Year Book or the plea roll account of the case. But it 
was not impossible that he would have been held a bastard, and 
this the English courts would not admit. Thorp, J. expressed the 
opinion of the court when he said that if such questions were sub- 
mitted to the Church, "... every Commissary could bastardize every 
man of the World without his even knowing about it, which would 
be great mischief." 37 
36. There was, it is true, some argument against these post mortem 
divorces, and Roman Church law today excludes them (Corpus Juris 
Canonici c. 1972). But it is not true, as is sometimes said, that they were 
canonically illegal in the Middle Ages. See the discussion in Antonius 
de Butrio's Lectura ad X 4.17.7, f. 87r. An example of such post mortem 
divorces, in the instance between a couple who had married seventy 
years before, can be found in the Dean and Chapter Archives, Canter- 
bury, Sede Vacante Scrapbook, III, no. 396 (1294). The ruling that the 
action would be entertained was, however, vigorously contested and ap- 
pealed to the Court of Arches. 
37. Y.B. 39 Edw. III, Mich., f. 31 (1365); C.P. 40/421 (Mich. 39 Edw. III) m. 
354. The English Common lawyers also complained with some fre- 
quency, and with some reason, about the long delays in the Church 
courts. In this same case, it was argued that bastardy ought not be sub- 
mitted to the bishop because "il purra estre delay per ans per appeals." 
In another case, reported Y.B. 38 Edw. III, Mich., f. 27, a lawyer com- 
plained that the party "aura grands delais devant l'Evesqe. Et si l'Ev- 
esqe ne vient pas accepter les proves, le party suera per appel, et aura 
long proces." These two cases also illustrate the Church's unwillingness 
to submit the procedure in its own courts to English law. Bracton ar- 
gued, at f. 420, that there could be no appeal of a judgement on bas- 
tardy from the bishop to whom the king's writ had been sent. But it is 
clear that this rule could not be enforced against the bishops, for they 
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Third, there were some other cases the royal justices refused to 
send to the church courts, although the two laws were not so clearly 
different in substance. If the bastardy of a dead man were alleged, 
the question was tried by assize, not sent to the bishop, without 
regard for the reason for the bastardy.38 If the legitimacy of one who 
was not party to the action was questioned (as where the title to 
land descended through, and depended on, an alleged bastard), the 
issue likewise went to a jury.39 In these instances, where no sub- 
stantive difference in the two laws could affect the outcome, the 
English courts took a more restrictive view of ecclesiastical juris- 
diction than principle alone warranted. The main reason they gave 
for the restriction was that non-parties would not be adequately 
represented before the Church court. In some ways, this seems more 
an excuse than a reason. The bishops could summon those who 
were alive, and the same problem of inadequate representation 
existed in trials by assize. It looks like a plain attempt to curtail 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
The Common lawyers had an answer to this charge. They said 
that in the royal courts, the bishops' certificates had a conclusive, 
pre-emptory force which jury verdicts did not.40 That is, a certificate 
of legitimacy or bastardy coming from the Church could not be 
challenged in a subsequent lawsuit, even between different parties. 
The verdict of jurors bound no one beyond the individual parties. 
Thus it was essential to hedge recourse to the bishops with proce- 
dural safeguards. If a man's legitimacy could be conclusively settled 
by the bishops in a suit to which he was not a party, he might be 
would not answer the writ if there were an appeal. In a case heard in 
the Common Pleas in 1277, the party who had appealed in the Church 
court was ordered to remit that appeal "si sibi videtur expedire ita 
quod episcopus procedere possit," C.P. 40/17 (Mich. 4-5 Edw. I) m. 
144. But, as the cautious language suggests, it is not clear how far this 
remedy was enforced. 
38. Bracton f. 269; Y.BB. 20 Edw. I. (R.S.), 172-73; 2 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 
17), 95; 39 Edw. III, Hil., f. 2 (1365). The situation did not in fact arise as 
frequently as it might have because of the exception made for the bas- 
tard eignd. If a bastard entered as son and heir, and held the land until 
his death, title based on his possession could not be challenged later. 
See F. E. Farrer, "The Bastard Eign6" in 33 L. Q. Rev., 135-53 (1917) and 
Vol. 34, 27-34 (1918). The rule did not, apparently, hold against the king; 
K.B. 27/392 (Trin. 32 Edw. III) Rex m. 3. 
39. Y.BB. 9 Edw. III, Trin. no. 4, f. 19 (1335), 17 Edw. III, Mich. no. 54, 
f. 59 (1343). That the rule was not in every case respected is indicated 
by Rotuli Parliamentorum, ii, 171a (1347), a complaint that a case of bas- 
tardy of a non-party had been sent to the Church, to his later prejudice. 
40. See Y.B. 12 Ric. II (Ames Foundation), 74; Rot. Parl., iii, 490a; 
Hooper, Law of Illegitimacy, 77. 
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deprived of the chance to bring forward all the proof he had. This 
is true because in a lawsuit in which he had no interest in the out- 
come, he would have little incentive to present his strongest case. 
Such, at any rate, was the lawyers' argument, and there is some co- 
gency to it. 
The argument depends, of course, entirely on the effectiveness 
of the bishops' certificates in the English courts. And although 
the rule of conclusiveness was often cited and mostly followed, a 
number of cases show an unwillingness by the judges to enforce 
it when injustice or fraud would result. The Common law justices 
were sometimes tied to mechanical application of technical rules 
in the fourteenth century, but on more than one occasion they 
dealt freely with this one. In a case from 1337, for example, it was 
pleaded that the plaintiff was a bastard by reason of birth before his 
parents' marriage. The plaintiff countered by showing record of a 
bishop's certificate from a previous decision testifying to his legiti- 
macy. The court, however, refused to accept it as conclusive. As 
Shareshull, J. said, "I cannot have this answer because with it a 
man would gain inheritance against the law of the land." 41 Even 
where the situation was not so clearly that of the Council of Merton, 
the justices were willing on occasion to disregard the rule. In 
Trinity term of 1354, another litigant sought to introduce a bishop's 
certificate from a previous action of formedon and was driven to 
answer when the court again refused to accept it.42 
A legitimate reason for the justices' disregard of the rule of 
conclusiveness was that it encouraged fraud on the English law. 
It was easy enough to set up one collusive lawsuit which raised 
bastardy without involving substantive conflict between the laws, 
get a bishop's certificate on the court records, then plead the certifi- 
cate as conclusive when bastardy was raised in a subsequent dis- 
pute. It was a subterfuge, though not a particularly clever one.43 
41. Y.B. Mich. 11-12 Edw, III (R.S.), 223-35. 
42. 26 Lib. Ass. no. 64 (1352). A similar result was reached in Y.B. 
Mich. 18-19 Edw. III (R.S.), 32-41. And in a case heard as early as 1277, 
the Common Pleas refused to accept as proof of a valid marriage the let- 
ter of the archbishop of Canterbury certifying the legitimacy of one son 
for entry into a benefice. The ground given was that where there had 
been no former plea in the royal courts, no ecclesiastical certificate 
could have conclusive force; C.P. 40 / 17 (Mich. 4-5 Edw. I) m. 144. 
43. It is interesting to note that Innocent IV was well aware of this 
abuse and sought to find a way to stop it; Apparatus ad X 4.17.7, f. 188 
. nec debet quis admitti ad petendum se pronunciari legitimum 
nisi habet contradictorem et iustum, et si admissus fuerit, nulla est sen- 
tencia." But as a fictitious "contradictor" could be set up, and since the 
bishop's certificate was ordinarily conclusive once on the English court 
records, this solution did little good. Complaints in Parliament gave rise 
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To allow it defeated a strong policy of English law. The justices 
were sometimes, but not always, willing to disregard the procedural 
rule of the force of the certificate. They invoked it freely as an 
excuse for limiting the jurisdiction of the Church courts, but were 
less ready to apply it when it meant the application of canon law to 
questions of inheritance of English land. 
The foregoing restrictions of the Church's jurisdiction to de- 
termine bastardy were probably less important than a fourth, the 
distinction between proprietary and possessory actions. Maitland 
has pointed it out: only when the action went to the right would 
recourse be had to the Church to determine legitimacy. Otherwise, 
bastardy would be tried "in what we may call a possessory spirit," 
that is by assize.44 It is possible that this distinction was 
evolved after Bracton's time for there is no explicit mention of it 
in his discussion of bastardy, but it was an established part of 
English law by the end of the century.45 
The justification for the rule is a familiar one, the same which 
had originally made possible the wide introduction of possessory 
assizes in the royal courts. Since it was theoretically always pos- 
sible to follow a possessory action with a writ of right, no one could 
be obliged to have his legitimacy tried by assize. He could always 
sue later by an action going fully to the right, and the question 
would be sent to the bishop. 
In this form, however, the argument is largely specious. The 
only class of cases which a party would especially want tried by the 
to a poorly worded and ineffective statute designed to curb the abuse 
(9 Hen. VI, c. 11). In the 16th century Christopher St. Germain took note 
of it, but all he could suggest was a moral obligation on the part of the 
defrauder to return the property so acquired. Doctor and Student, Sec- 
ond Dialogue, c. 5 (London, 1721), 139. This is the weakest of solutions, 
obviously, for if such a man were minded to return the property, he 
would not have brought the fraudulent suit in the first place. No doubt, 
also, such a man would think it was the English law, not his collusive 
law suit, which was of dubious morality. 
44. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (Cambridge, (1898), 
Vol. II, 380; Bastardy questions in writs of entry seem also to have gone 
to the country. C.P. 40/183 (Mich. 4 Edw. II) m. 111d; C.P. 40,216 (Mich. 10 
Edw. II) m. 23. 
45. Compare Bracton, f. 216b with Britton, f. 128. It is perhaps worth 
noting that support could be found for the English distinction in canon- 
ical-civilian theory, as set out in Guillelmus Durandus, Speculum Iuris 
t. de ordine cognitionum (Frankfort, 1668), II, 202. Durandus held that 
both when the spiritual question was prejudicial to the secular, as it al- 
ways was in bastardy cases, the prejudicial question must be tried first, 
that is by the ecclesiastical court. He goes on to say, however, that this 
is true only for proprietary actions. "Si vero agitur possessorie et reus 
obiiciat preiudicialem exceptionem, secus est." 
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Church were th,-se in which English and canon law were at vari- ance. These, we have seen, it was the policy of the English courts to 
refuse to submit to the Church in the first place. Where the two 
laws were identical, it made little difference how the issue was 
tried. Thus, the result of the distinction between actions of right and 
of possession was, or ought to have been, to considerably restrict the 
number of cases which would be sent to the ecclesiastical tribu- 
nals. Actions of right were less frequent in the royal courts than 
possessory actions, so that the distinction, if rigorously followed, 
would have very largely removed bastardy litigation from the juris- 
diction of the Church. We do know that it was not absolutely ap- 
plied, for there were a few possessory actions which did in the 
event go to the bishops. But certainly, the distinction was very 
largely followed in the first half of the 14th century.46 
To summarize briefly, the practice of sending questions of 
bastardy to the Church at the start of the fourteenth century was 
this. A number of specific situations had been developed in which 
the royal courts would not, unless the parties agreed otherwise, 
refer to the ecclesiastical forum. They were of two sorts. The first 
included cases where a substantive difference in the definition of 
legitimacy existed. Children of adulterous liaisons, those born be- 
fore their parents' espousals, and those whose parents' marriage 
had been dissolved came under this heading. The second consisted 
of cases where the refusal was based on procedural grounds. 
Bastardy of dead men and other non-parties, and most importantly, 
possessory as against proprietary actions came under this second. 
Retention for trial by jury, we noted above, was a necessary 
step in the first class, a step required to vindicate the principle that 
English law, not canon law, should determine inheritance of Eng- 
lish land. As to the second group, reasons could likewise be given 
for each of its categories, but especially with the right-possession 
distinction, the result was not at all required by English law, in 
the same way that keeping cases of pre-nuptial or adulterous 
children out of the bishops' hands was. Retention of the cases in 
the second class was rather a slightly veiled attack on ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction than a vindication of English principles of inherit- 
ance. And it had one unfortunate result. The wide use of the second 
class focused attention almost entirely on the form in which the 
claim of bastardy had been raised. The essential question became, 
not what the reason for bastardy was, but how it had been raised. 
Whether or not the issue went to the Courts Christian depended not 
46. K.B. 27/373 (Mich. 27 Edw. III) m. 45; Y.BB. 5 Edw. II (S.S. Vol. 33), 
161-69 (1312); Pasch. 14 Edw. III (R.S.), 55 (1340); 26 Lib. Ass. no. 64 
(1352), in which, however, Thorp, J. appears to have dissented. 
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on a question in which English inheritance law was at stake, but on 
a question of form. 
It should not be totally surprising, then, that the end result of 
the possessory-right distinction in bastardy cases, and to a lesser 
extent that of the other procedural distinctions, was not a happy 
one. Theoretically, it should have been possible to keep all the 
cases straight. Mastery of technical pleading, we may say, was an 
essential part of an English lawyer's job; it was not a business for 
amateurs, and as long as the pleading reflected the real issues of 
conflict between Church and State, there need have been no diffi- 
culties. But in fact there were difficulties. The English lawyers were 
not the masters of pleading such distinctions required. In the first 
half of the fourteenth century, the emptiest of formalism seemed 
often to control, and the substance of English law was often sacri- 
ficed to considerations of pleading alone. Citation of a specific case 
may make this clear. Le Fevre v. Sleght, heard in 1313, was brought 
on a writ of right in which the demandant was challenged as being 
born before espousals, the classic Statute of Merton situation. But 
Scrope, for the demandant, argued: "This is a writ of right; judgement 
if such an answer should be allowed if you do not say simply 
bastard." This argument was accepted, and the court drove the tenant 
to allege general bastardy, which had to go to the Church for trial.47 
It need hardly be said that this was bad law. Le Fevre v. Sleght 
raised exactly the issue which the events at Merton and after had 
made clear the royal courts had to retain for decision. Instead, that 
distinction was ignored. The distinction between writs of right and 
possessory actions and the technicalities of pleading had taken over 
and obscured the substantive issue of the inheritance claims of pre- 
nuptial children. But the same result was reached in other cases, 
notably one from 1334, in which the court sought to escape it by 
saying that it would accept a spontaneous finding of bastardy re- 
turned by the jurors, but that if bastardy were pleaded at all, the 
matter had to go to the bishop.48 Confirmation of the unfortunate 
result comes from the Parliament records of 1327, when a petition 
complained that the bishops were hearing such bastardy cases 
and requested that henceforth the king's justices would themselves 
determine the issue by jury verdict.49 
47. Y.B. 7 Edw. II (S.S. Vol. 36), 158. 
48. 8 Lib. Ass. no. 5 (1334). See also K.B. 27/326 (Mich. 15 Edw. III) m. 
165d; C.P. 40/195a (Mich. 6 Edw. II) m. 397; Y.BB. 6 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 43), 
72; 7 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 36), 105-06. 
49. Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie hactenus inediti, eds. H. G. Richard- 
son and G. Sayles (Camden Soc., 1935), Vol. II, 125: "Item pur ceo qe 
grant debate ad este entre frers dont lun nasquist devant les esposails 
et lauter apres, et grant delaye ad este en court cristien, qe desormes 
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Just as the right-possession distinction caused confusion, so 
the rule that the legitimacy of dead men would be tried by assize 
likewise gave rise to difficulty. We saw above that for procedural 
reasons, the legitimacy of non-parties was tried by assize. But we 
now begin to find the contention made that bastardy of living men 
could only be tried by Court Christian.50 Also, we find cases in 
which it was said that the bastardy of a tenant of land in dispute 
could only be tried by the bishops.51 Neither of these arguments 
made sense. The essential matter was to protect the English inherit- 
ance law, and these in fact thwarted it. They sent questions to the 
bishops which should have been retained. That the question of a 
dead man's legitimacy could not go to the bishops does not prove 
that a live man's must, for he may have been born of adultery or 
before his parents' espousals. That the law accorded some proce- 
dural advantages to the tenant as against the demandant is no 
reason to grant him trial of bastardy by bishop's certificate, for a 
tenant may be bastard by English law, legitimate by canon law as 
well as a demandant. 
It is not always clear how far these arguments were adopted 
by the courts. The Year Book accounts concentrate on pleading 
rather than on judgements, so that we very often do not know how 
a particular case came out. But the plea rolls show that the court 
often did sanction a result contrary to English law. And when the 
arguments were repeated in case after case, over the course of 
years, and answered with neither good sense nor good law, it is 
clear that the law was in a confused state as regards trial of bas- 
tardy. And in the instances above the result of the confusion was to 
submit some cases of disputed inheritance to the jurisdiction of the 
Church, the exact opposite of what the barons at Merton had 
desired. 
The conflicting results and confused arguments of the Year 
Book cases of the first half of the fourteenth century show that 
concentration on considerations of form and the lack of mastery of 
the art of pleading had confused the issue which had been more 
clearly drawn by Bracton. We have seen that this confusion led to 
ne soit tiel delaye, mes qe les iustices pernent enqueste sil nasquist de- 
vant ou non et sur ceo face jugement." 
50. See, for example, Y.B. 7 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 36), 96, where it was ob- 
jected, ".... la manere de vostre repouns est insufficient encountre 
cely qest en pleyne vie, qe ne put james estre bastard saunz certifica- 
tion del Evesqe." Or see Y.B. 9 Edw. III, Trin., f. 19 (1335). 
51. Y.BB. 6 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 43), 72-74; 9 Edw. III, Trin., f. 19 (1335). 
Bracton, at f. 418b, gave it as the rule that the burden of proof would 
be on the demandant, so that the tenant had this advantage, but there 
is nothing of the rule argued for in this Y.B. Case. 
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some cases being sent to the Church which should have been kept 
by the royal courts. But we should also note that it opened the way 
for attempts to avoid sending to the bishops cases which rightfully 
belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This was possible through 
a series of verbal tricks. It began to be argued that if one avoided 
using the actual word "bastard" in the pleadings, jurisdiction could 
be withdrawn from the Church. Thus, allegations in such forms as 
these appeared: the claimant was "not of the blood of," or "his father 
never married his mother," or "he was not the son of," his alleged 
ancestor.52 Such pleadings neither raised any issue on which Eng- 
lish law differed from canon law, nor amounted to anything more 
than a plain exception of bastardy. All they did was to avoid the use 
of the word "bastard," so that it could be argued that "special 
matter" had been introduced. This practice was senseless. The 
point of pleading special matter, a' Bracton had explained it, was 
to determine whether the case was one in which English law and 
canon law were different, not to give the party raising the bastardy 
issue the choice of which forum he wanted.53 
Of course, such "dodges" were not in every instance accepted. 
But it is clear that.they sometimes were, and the testimony from 
the Church's side makes it obvious that these cases were not going 
unnoticed. Most of the examples of this sort of pleading that we 
have come from the first part of Edward II's reign. And the lone 
ecclesiastical complaint, of which we have record, against trial of 
bastardy in the royal courts comes from just that period. At the 
Council of London and Lambeth in 1309, a petition to the King was 
formulated, objecting that "certain justices of late, if the excep- 
tion is proposed before them in this form, 'he is not legitimate,' 
take cognisance of it in fact." The bishops asked that "notwith- 
standing the variation of the words, the judges desist from hearing 
such cases." 54 We do not know what immediate effect the petition 
had. Perhaps very little. All the same, attempts to evade ecclesiasti- 
cal jurisdiction by mere "variation of words" do very largely dis- 
appear from the Year Books after Edward II's reign. 
We should note here that it was largely by the use of such 
purely formal variations that jurisdiction over bastardy was with- 
52. Y.BB. 5 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 31), 186-91, 7 Edw. II (S.S., Vol. 36), 105- 
107; 11 Lib. Ass. no. 20 (1337); "Pleas at Law 1300-1312", Brit. Mus. Add. 
MS. 35, 116, f. 34r; C.P. 40/195a (Mich. 6 Edw. II)m. 92; C.P. 40/216 (Mich. 10 
Edw. II) m. 122. 
53. Bracton, f. 416: "sed quoniam ubi causa non adicitur sub tali re- 
sponsione poterit esse obscuritas et incertitudo, quia cum sciri non po- 
terit ad quod forum pertinere debeat cognitio 
54. Council and Synods with other Documents relating to the English 
Church II, eds. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford, 1964), Pt. I, 1273. 
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drawn from the Church on the Continent. Rather than by frontal 
attacks on the rights of the Church courts, Continental jurists used 
indirect and technical distinctions to achieve the same result. Per- 
haps we should see in the English practices to which the 1309 
Council objected the start of the same process in England. But, 
in the event, it was a road the English lawyers did not take. Having 
advanced some steps down it, the Common lawyers withdrew, 
leaving the English Church's rights unimpaired. Whether they 
did so because of the unfortunate results which had followed we 
cannot be sure. But it is certain that most of the confusion in the 
pleading which is found in the reign of Edward II on this issue had 
disappeared by the middle of the century. It is difficult not to see in 
this a growing understanding of the issues involved. And we must 
note that in the process the justices rejected the method of re- 
stricting ecclesiastical jurisdiction through purely formal varia- 
tion in pleading. Here, at least, they did not show themselves 
jealous of the Church's jurisdiction. 
If the Churchmen's protest, or judicial astuteness, gradually 
eliminated this particularly obnoxious trick, the possession-right 
distinction which had, by its emphasis on form, created a part of 
the climate in which such confusion could flourish was left un- 
touched. Though it had doubtless kept a large number of cases 
out of the Church courts, the "possessory spirit" had led, like the 
others mentioned, to difficulty and some confusion. Solution came 
in 1364, in a case of novel disseisin from Surrey. It is worth setting 
out the facts. The original holder of the land in dispute had had two 
daughters. The plaintiff was the issue of one of them. The defend- 
ant had been enfeoffed with the entire piece of land by the other 
daughter, and was in possession. One daughter had, in other words, 
alienated the entire inheritance as if she held the fee, not simply 
the half which came to her by English law. Thus the plaintiff had 
a good claim to her mother's share of the inheritance, except that 
the defendant objected that she was illegitimate. If that were 
true, of course, none of the land could have descended to the plain- 
tiff and the feoffment to the defendant was perfectly lawful. 
For some reason, perhaps with prompting, the plaintiff asked 
for a writ to the bishop of Winchester to try the bastardy. The de- 
fendant demanded trial by assize, "since that has been the use up 
to now". Finch, J. agreed that this was the practice, but said he saw 
no good reason for it. Since, in fact if not in theory, "blood will be 
tried in a writ of assize for ever as well as in any other writ," the 
distinction did not seem sensible to him. "There is," he said, "as 
much good reason to send to Court Christian in this case as in any 
other writ." 55 
55. Y.B. 38 Edw. III, Mich., f. 26: ". ... mes jeo ne scay pas voier per 
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Finally, the matter was adjourned before the Court of Common 
Pleas, where the justices said (in the words of the Year Book), "We 
have taken advice of all our masters herein, and are all of one ac- 
cord. As well in assizes as in other writs if bastardy is alleged 
against a party, it will be sent to Court Christian." 56 With that, 
they abolished a rule of practice which had been good law for at 
least seventy-five years. Thereafter, there were some attempts made 
by pleaders to get the justices to return to the old rule, but they 
came to naught.57 
The happy issue of this decision was to concentrate attention 
once more on the substantive differences between English law and 
canon law. If a child were said to be born before his parents' mar- 
riage, the royal courts kept the case, whatever the form of the ac- 
tion. If bastardy was alleged generally, without special matter, 
then the issue was submitted to the bishops. In this decision lay 
some of the means for clearing away the confusion which 
clouded thinking on this issue of conflict between Church and 
State. The Year Books of the later fourteenth and the fifteenth 
centuries have little of the variety of treatment and disorder of argu- 
ment about this subject which mark their predecessors. The read- 
ings at the Inns of Court and the treatises of Fortescue, Littleton, 
and Coke are clear on the essential issue: the substantive differ- 
ences in definition of bastardy by Church and State.58 The refusal 
to send allegations of bastardy of non-parties was retained, but the 
reason que nous poiomes mults trier de bastardie in Assize que in auter 
bref, car le sank sera try in ceo bref d'Assize pur toujours auxi bien 
come in auter brief." Unfortunately, one of the few De Banco rolls miss- 
ing from this period is this one from the Michaelmas term of 38 Edward 
III. 
56. ibid., "Purque nous avons priz avis de touts nos Masters cyens, et 
sumes tout d'un accorde; et auxy bien in Assise come in auter bref si 
bastardie suit allege in cesty qui est party, home mandra au Court 
Chrestien." 
57. Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Mich. no. 16, f. 34 (1464): "Et issint est de bastard, 
l'issue pris sur ceo en action personel serra trie per le Evesque auxibien 
come en le plea real, en uncore devant ceo temps en eigne temps le use 
fuist auterment, scilicet en actions personel a trier per le pais, mes ore 
change." Cf. also Y.B. 49 Edw. III Pasch. no. 11, f. 18 (1375); C.P. 40/458 
(Pasch. 49 Edw. III) m. 395. Confirmation of the effectiveness of the rul- 
ing can be found in an unprinted Lincoln Episcopal Register, containing 
a collection of royal writs from the late fourteenth century. It has three 
judicial writs sent to the bishop to certify bastardy in possessory ac- 
tions: Lincolnshire Archives Office, Reg. XIIb, f. 19v (1369); f. 48r 
(1386); f. 73v (1396). 
58. Readings and Moots at the Inns of Court in the fifteenth century, 
ed. S. E. Thorne (S.S., Vol. 71), cxi-cxii; Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum 
Anglie, ed. S. E. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1949), 99; Co. Lit. 245a. 
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possessory-right distinction made no further appearance. The 1364 
decision was a sign, perhaps also a condition, of the maturing of 
one area of English Common law. 
On the question of conflict between Church and State, the 
significance of that decision is that it was taken actually in favor 
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. From the point of view of strict logic, 
the confusion might have as easily been cleared away by trying 
all bastardy cases by assize. This would have removed the problem 
entirely. And it was the attitude adopted in most Continental juris- 
dictions. Surely there was much to recommend it. But here, in the 
same year a Statute of Praemunire was adopted, the royal judges 
went out of their way to uphold, and in fact to increase, the extent 
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Whether they did so from conserva- 
tism, piety, or good sense, I do not know. But they must have 
realised that the real issue of conflict between Church and State 
was over inheritance of land by children of questionable birth, not 
one of competition between rival court systems. On the substantive 
issue, English law would not yield. But in this instance at least, the 
English justices showed themselves far from wishing to diminish 
the jurisdiction of the Courts Christian in their own favor. 
In conclusion then, it can be said that the story of bastardy 
litigation in the Middle Ages is one in which there were very real 
elements of disagreement between Church and State, but that this 
disagreement is perhaps overshadowed by mutual accommodation 
and even harmony. The Church found, we saw in the first part of 
this paper, good reasons within its own law not to push the ele- 
ments of disagreement. Where inheritance of lay fee was the basic 
issue, the canonists and churchmen recognized the force, if not 
perhaps the unimpeachable logic, of the secular jurists' arguments. 
And the English courts, for their part, rejected several precedents 
which allowed avoidance of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over bas- 
tardy cases by formal or procedural techniques. They abolished a 
long-standing rule of procedure so as to favor ecclesiastical juris- 
diction. 
In this, the Common law courts give evidence of an important 
growth in sophistication and control of pleading which took place 
in the middle years of the fourteenth century. Coke, who professed 
to be quoting a judge of the reign of Henry IV, wrote that, "In the 
reign of Edward the third, pleadings grew to perfection both with- 
out lamenesse and curiosity, . . . , for before that time the maner 
of pleading was but feeble in comparison of that it was afterward 
in the reign of the same king." 59 The source Coke claimed for this 
assertion has never been traced. But the history of bastardy litiga- 
tion gives some warrant for accepting its substance. 
59. Co. Lit. 304b. 
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III 
The sequel to this account of bastardy litigation in the Mid- 
dle Ages is perhaps worth telling. The English Reformation made 
no apparent changes in the practice. Questions of general bas- 
tardy still went to the bishops for decision. The system was still 
in operation in Blackstone's day, and it was only in the nineteenth 
century that bastardy jurisdiction was finally removed from the 
Church courts.60 
The stand of the barons at the Council of Merton has had an 
even longer life. In the 1830's, the highest English courts found 
reason to again approve the rule, and in striking language. The 
rule, they said "is sown in the land, springs out of it, and cannot, 
according to the law of England, be abrogated or destroyed by any 
foreign rule of law whatsoever." 61 As in the Middle Ages, the out- 
come depended on land. It was only in 1920 by Act of Parliament, 
that the principle which had earned the unanimous and long-tinme 
disapproval of English barons was finally accepted. The Legitimacy 
Act of that year extended fully legitimate status to children born 
before their parents' wedlock.62 It is difficult not to wonder what 
Grosseteste's reaction would be to the delay. 
60. 3 Bl. Comm. 355; William Clerk's The Trial of Bastardie (London, 
1594) gives instructions on how the process is to be carried out. And see 
Hooper, The Law of Illegitimacy, 76. 
61. Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 2 C1.-Fin. 571, at 579, 6 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1835), 
affirmed 7 C1.-Fin. 895, 7 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1840). 
62. 16-17 Geo. V, c. 60. 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:59:19 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
